Research on Strategic Development of the Chinese Communist Party after the Cold War Marine_Take Marine Law Enforcement Agency as an Example

• Main Author: 黃世倫
• Other Authors: 朱新民
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/hey9cn

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 外交學系戰略與國際事務碩士在職專班 === 105 === The rise of the CCP, both in terms of economic strength and international influence, has increased considerably. Its military forces have also grown significantly, especially in the part of the maritime force, and some countries also regard the maritime law enforcement organizations as quasi-military Sexual organization and more attention, therefore, marine force should include a country's naval and marine law enforcement organizations, including the United Nations in 1982 through the Convention on the Law of the Sea, marine rights and marine resources issues more international attention. In recent years, the development of China's maritime strategy has shown a number of characteristics. In the military task, the first is to build aircraft carriers and amphibious ships to strengthen the force of projection; to modernize the naval vessels to strengthen the ability of marine control; use of asymmetric operations The use of maritime force to promote cross-border cooperation and exchanges; in the police task, the integration of the five Marine law enforcement organizations, to strengthen the construction of marine law enforcement ships. The growth of the maritime force of the CCP also has different effects at different levels. The assessment at the global level has first changed the strategic landscape of the Western Pacific; secondly, the impact of the US maritime strategy and, ultimately, the impact of the Indian Ocean's existing strategic situation. At the Asia-Pacific level, the impact on the marine interests of the South China Sea disputed countries was first impacted; followed by the impact on Japan's marine interests in Northeast Asia; the arms race in the Asia-Pacific region would eventually rise.