Corporate Hedging and Mergers

• Main Authors: WU, KUAN-MIN, 吳冠旻
• Other Authors: Lin Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2017
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2hej3m

碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 財務金融學系 === 105 === Using the data of U.S mergers over the period 1992 to 2013, this study examines the effects of corporate hedging policy on merger’s acquisition decisions, including the timing of merger, payment method, complexity of a deal, relative size, announcement return, and post-merger long-term performance. Empirical results indicate that (i) hedging firms are less likely to merge in the merger wave, make a cash offer, undertake larger deals, take less time to complete the deal, and lead to a better operating performance than non-hedging firms, (ii) hedging acquirers in the merger wave are more likely to make a cash offer, but undertake smaller deals, and take more time to complete the deal than those out of the merger wave. Further our evidence shows that hedging activities can reduce the time to complete the deal in the merger wave, and hedging acquirers have a better long-term performance than non-hedging acquirers in the merger wave. These results suggest that corporate hedging can bring some advantages in mergers to reduce the bad acquisition happens in the merger wave.