| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 105 === The first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 marked the start of an era in which the international community paid particular heed to the possibility of nuclear proliferation in East Asia. While vast research has been conducted on the subject of North Korean nuclear capabilities, little is known about the other Korea - a country regularly facing nuclear threats from North Korea, and which even has a record of attempting to develop its own nuclear weapons in the past. At the end of the 1960s, North Korea committed numerous military provocations against South Korea. A passive approach to such provocations by the US led to an increase of mistrust on the part of South Korea, towards the security guarantee provided by the US. It was under such an environment of national security that the then-President of South Korea, Park Chung-hee attempted nuclear armament as deterrence against North Korean hostility in the 1970s.
After the Cold war, East Asian security has continued to be severely threatened by the North Korean nuclear crises, with the occurrence of two more nuclear tests in 2016; At the same time, US-ROK (South Korea) military alliance is deemed to have become more unpredictable following President Donald Trump’s inauguration in 2017. Under such an unstable security environment, is it possible that South Korea will attempt to go nuclear again? Over 60% of South Koreans support the nation’s own nuclear weapons development and a few South Korean politicians strongly argue for nuclear armament; posing reasons for why this question is in dire need of attention.
To answer the afore-mentioned question, this study first examines South Korea’s nuclear challenges in the Cold War era and identifies the major factors that determine South Korea’s nuclear decisions, including national security, specifically against North Korean threats and the credibility of the US security guarantee. However, this research also finds that several influential domestic actors or international norms can critically influence vertical nuclear proliferation of South Korea. For this reason, this research applies Sagan’s three models of nuclear proliferation (Security, Domestic Politics, and Norms models) to analyze the possible incentives and constraints of each model regarding South Korea’s nuclear weapons development. This research aims to provide the multicausality of nuclear proliferation problems and form a foundation for future research regarding nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
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