| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 105 === This thesis discussed the competition and cooperation between the participatory budget (PB) and representative politics in Taipei, and how Taipei has developed correspondingly. While reviewing the relevant theories and studying notable domestic and global PB systems, we analyzed Executive-Legislative Relations、the relative strength of Executive power and Legislative power, as well as the legislature review of PB. This research complements a knowledge gap in literature that has yet to explore the impact of representative politics on the design and development of PB in a single city. Taipei is a divided government. Since 2015, it has implemented the PB model that, under the direction of the adminstration, accepts private budget proposals to be reviewed by the City Council. The experience made the Taipei city to have the most competition and cooperation between the excutive and legislative power among six special municiplies and most suitable as a case study for this project.
The study’s findings are as follows: First, the competition means that PB is often used as a political tool, which weakens the power of representative politics and creates new pressure and challenge. Secondly, cooperation means that there is a need to work together for political recruitment, training and solicitation of public opinions. Last but not the least, adminstrative-driven PB realizes its political commitments.However, councilors of different parties used strict standards in overseeing the implementation of the party policy and thus increased the bipartisan conflicts beyond the expectations of the city government. The conflict has graduated abated with a“rolling correction mechanism”launched by the city government, the perseverance of the mayor, and the emphasis on respecting the public opinions.
Because (1) the extent of PB is limited by the administrative capacity of the executive branch, and (2) the city has accumulated experiences in dealing with relevant clashes, the city has a reasonable expectation for future conflicts. From the institutional perspective, PB has little effect on representative politics. From the perspective of political maneuver, PB can bring the mayor new voters. From the view of political power, the executive and legislative branches are still in the process of political socialization, that is, finding their ways to work together. When PB’s positive influence on representative politics emerges, the effect of cooperation will eventually be greater than that of competition. At the end of this study, we have several propositions to reduce the conflict: (1) Establish appropriate legalizations for PB. (2) Incorporate citizen participation in statutory budget process. (3) Establish key indicators to monitor the process of competition and cooperation. (4) Continue to monitor and revise the mechanism of PB as needed. (5) The council to voluntarily call on the executive branch to promote relevant issues. (6) Support a culture of citizen participation. But we cannot expect to completely eliminate the conflicts. Taipei’s experience can offer the following lessons: (1)The determination and political power of the mayor is critical. (2) We need to establish a mechanism for PB and a government-run education center is indispensable. (3) There needs to be sufficient administrative resources. (4) The executive branch need to properly acknowledge and handle the process of competition and compromise of PB.
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