Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation, and Bank Performance in Indonesia

• Main Authors: AGUNG DHARMAWAN BUCHDADI, 安志誠
• Other Authors: TE-KUANG CHOU
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/tggpfq

博士 === 南臺科技大學 === 經營管理博士學位學程 === 105 === This thesis aims to examine the impact of the good corporate governance (GCG) variables proposed by the central bank to bank performance and also examine the determinant of compensation from the GCG variables and the firm performance. The GOG variables are the independent board (IB), the annual board meeting (BM), the percentage of annual board of director meeting attendance (ABM), the annual board-executive meeting (BEM), the percentage of annual board-executive meeting attendance (ABEM), audit committee (AC), audit committee meeting (ACM), the percentage of annual audit committee meeting attendance (AACM), risk committee (RC), risk committee meeting (RCM), and the percentage of annual risk committee meeting attendance (ARCM), remuneration and nomination committee (RNC), remuneration and nomination committee meeting (RNCM), and the percentage of annual remuneration and nomination committee meeting attendance (ARNCM). We developed 10 model equations and analyzed it using two stage least square (2SLS) regression to deal with the endogeinity problems. The data are the listed bank in Indonesia capital market from 2006 to 2015. The findings reveal that the independent board (IB) only have positive effect to net interest margin ratio (NIM) of the samples and especially the big banks. However, the IB does have significant impact on the ROA and the market value–based performance. In addition, the findings show that the attendance level of board meeting (ABM) has a positive impact on the ROA and NIM among the small banks. It also found that attendance level of board-executive meeting (ABEM) has a positive impact on the ROA among the big banks. Finally, It is also noted that audit committee meeting in the small banks has a positive effect to the ROA, while the big banks will enhance the market value- based performance. In addition, the attendance of audit meeting will also improve the market value among the big banks. In addition, the findings regarding the performance on pay relation as it is mainly suggested in agency theory reveal that accounting-based performancehas a positive impact on the executive’s compensation (EC). However, the market-value based performance does not provide a positive impact on the EC. In addition, the results regarding the pay on the performance relation reveal that the EC has a positive impact on accounting-based performance, but not the market-value based performance. Then, in Indonesia, the pay (executive compensation) on performance (accounting-based performance) and the performance on pay relationship have a dynamic correlation in which both correlations are valid. Finally, the study on the ownership structure, we found that the ownership concentration holders behave differently with the thesis in agency theory which will more focus to monitor the bank to make it have better performance as they have the benefit and the reason to do so. Beside, in the state banks, the findings reveal that the pay has a positive impact on accounting based performance, the accounting based performance also has a positive impact on executive’s compensation, and the remuneration committee has a negative relationship to the executives’ compensation. While only in the state bank the remuneration and nomination committee has a good impact on both accounting-based performance and market value-based performance