CFOs’ Incentives and Debt Financing

碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 105 === This study investigates the effect of Cheief financial officers’(CFOs’) risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies. The sample includes S&P 500 firms over year 2006 to 2012. The results show that the risk-taking incentives of CFOs does not signif...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHEN, TING-RUI, 陳廷睿
Other Authors: CHOU, SHU-CHING
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2017
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/rw65k4
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 105 === This study investigates the effect of Cheief financial officers’(CFOs’) risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies. The sample includes S&P 500 firms over year 2006 to 2012. The results show that the risk-taking incentives of CFOs does not significantly relate to capital structure decision. However, the risk-taking incentives of CFOs significantly influence their firms’ financing policies. We find CFOs’ risk-decreasing(-increasing) incentives are associated with safer(risker) debt-maturity choices.