| Summary: | 碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程) === 105 === The purpose of this study is to explore whether the seven ownership structure and the three board ratio affect the results of CEO compensation. We divide the ownership structure and board ratio into three types of power according to the past literature: (1) Inside ownership(CEO ownership, CFO ownership, Employee ownership, Managerial ownership, Inside board ratio) which is consistent with convergence of interest hypothesis (2) Outside ownership(Independent ownership, Institutional ownership, Outside director ratio) which is consistent with monitoring effect (3) Affiliated ownership(Gray ownership, Linked director ratio) which is consistent with manipulation effect, and measure their impact on CEO compensation. This study focuses on the impact of ownership structure and board ratio on CEO compensation, and expects inside ownership is positively linked with CEO compensation; outside ownership is negatively linked with CEO compensation; affiliated ownership is positively linked with CEO compensation. The ordinary least-squares (OLS) analysis is applied to inspect the relationship and S&P 100 firms are observed from 2003 to 2012 in this study. The empirical evidence indicates Perks have more effect than TDC1 in terms of ownership structure; only independent ownership is consistent with CEO compensation; there exists positive relation between compensation and outside director ratio which is opposite to my originally assumed. We also find that linked director ratio among affiliated ownership is positively associated with CEO compensation. Investors should choose companies with higher independent ownership which can supervise effectively and avoid choosing companies which have more linked director ratio, because of manipulation effect.
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