Executive Compensation and Audit Committee Quality

• Main Authors: Wei-Yin Wang, 王維吟
• Other Authors: Shin-Rong Shiah-Hou
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2017
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/23671187751497462061

碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程) === 105 === The paper provides evidence that audit committees play an importance role in the company because they are major factor in monitoring firms’ financial reports so as to reduce agency problem. I investigate whether audit committee quality (corporate governance) is associated with executives’ compensation (incentives). I examine the quality of audit committee and incentives are as substitutes or complementary by running simultaneous regressions to see their bidirectional relationship. Besides, I added factors of firms’ accounting complexity and business risk to see whether the result may change. Overall, my findings provide insight that audit committee quality and incentives are as substitutes. However, after considering firms’ accounting complexity and business risk, the effect of substitution would be weakened.