Vertically Related Markets and International Technology Licensing

• Main Authors: CHIU, YA-HUI, 邱雅慧
• Other Authors: SHIH, PEI-CYUAN
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mp3637

碩士 === 銘傳大學 === 國際企業學系碩士班 === 106 === In the view of the current international cooperation and technology licensing, the issue of international technology licensing has become increasingly important. The total amount of domestic technology licensing output has increased year by year from NT$26 billion and reached NT$36.2 billion in the year 2010 to 2015 in Taiwan. While Taiwan’s technology imports increased from NT$141.7 billion in 2010 to NT$160.1 billion in 2015. International technology licensing not only strengthens the relationship between licensing partners in the international community, but also enables intellectual property owners to create a stable source of income. On the other hand, it is known that different government policies will affect consumer surplus and social welfare at home and abroad. The purpose of this study is to develop the international technology licensing under the vertically related markets and tariff policy. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of changes in profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare before and after licensing. The methods used in this study are the subgame perfect theory and the backward induction. To discuss whether an upstream insider licensor or a downstream insider licensor under the vertically related markets will have technology licensing and what is the optimal international technology licensing contracts. And explore government policies, such as: how the government's import tariffs affect the licensor's/licensee’s optimal decision-making and licensing behavior, consumer surplus and social welfare. The results of this research show that (1) An upstream insider licensor or a downstream insider licensor under the vertically related markets will have technology licensing. They will receive a fixed-fee licensing. (2) An upstream insider licensor or a downstream insider licensor will do licensing, when the tariffs are large enough to licensing. (3) After an upstream insider licensor or a downstream insider licensor do licensing, the licensed consumer surplus will increase, but the social welfare whether increase or not, depends on the decrease of production costs of upstream manufacturers and the increase in the output of downstream manufacturers, and whether there is a margin greater than or equal to the government tariff.