Earnings Management And Lockups Of Seasoned Equity Offerings

• Main Authors: Yi-Zhen Li, 李宜蓁
• Other Authors: Tung-Hsiao Yang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/6n7h38

碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 財務金融學系所 === 106 === We document the relation between earnings management and lockups of seasoned equity offerings and concern whether SEO firms with aggressive earnings management are more likely to release their lockups early. We work on several issues: (1)The relation between information asymmetry and lockups of seasoned equity offerings, (2)The relation between earnings management and early release of lockups, (3)The difference of the performance between the firms with varied earnings management. Our empirical results shows that firms with greater information asymmetry are more likely to have lockups. We also find that SEO firms with aggressive earnings management are more likely to release their lockups early and the cumulative excess return are positive around the early release day. But after the release day, investors’ downward valuation is more serious for firms with aggressive earnings management then those with conservative earnings management.