A Study on the Inefficient Production of Public Construction-Public Choice Perspective

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 不動產與城鄉環境學系 === 106 === Public construction, which is the foundation of national development, is planned and implemented by the government to ensure it coordinated with social needs. Public construction promotes national development, boosts public investment for economic development...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: LIN, HUNG-JU, 林宏儒
Other Authors: TSENG, MING-HSUN
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2018
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3s3s3p
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 不動產與城鄉環境學系 === 106 === Public construction, which is the foundation of national development, is planned and implemented by the government to ensure it coordinated with social needs. Public construction promotes national development, boosts public investment for economic development and balance regional development, there are many questions on "Forward-Looking Infrastructure Project". The questions are, "inefficiency of the use of public constructions, which leads ", "public debt is rising too fast to afford" and "low birth rate will lead to the negative growth of population and thus overestimate the demand for public construction". It seems that Taiwan has the problem on over production of public construction. Public construction project is complicatedly interwoven not only with assessing internal costs, benefits but also externalities, and indirect effect. Although legal system applies various measures to regulate it, it’s still difficult to determine whether the public construction is the most suitable or not by only examining its project content. "Public choice perspective" effectively simplifies the judgment criteria. It proposes that public affairs (politics) should be considered as a exchange. The participants in the market have the motivation of maximizing their personal benefits (including politicians influencing decision making for votes), which results in inefficient production of public construction. Therefore, if the system could restraint the self-interest motivation or induce people to pursue the maximization of the overall benefits (including avoiding political interference), the problem of “government failure” can be solved. In order to understand whether the system and various measures could effectively restrain the problem of over production, the current study analyzes “decision mechanism for public construction” by “public choice perspective” and “fuzzy analytic hierarchy process”. It is found that the system is not good enough to avoid inefficient production of public construction. The current study considers the inefficient production of public construction as the inevitable outcome of the democratic system and expansionary fiscal policy. Moreover, it is difficult to estimate the benefits of a public construction and to assess the value preferences of the society. Subsequently, the researcher recommends to strengthen the budget control mechanism from a pragmatic perspective. In addition, public construction decision-making should put more emphasis on the concept that the program is rational, and seek for the possibility of establishing the concept of people's financial discipline and the efficiency of public construction in the future.