| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 法律學研究所 === 106 === This thesis intends to re-evaluate the issue of the legal enforcement of morality in the light of the debates between legal moralism and liberalism. The initial objective of this thesis is to examine the classic debates between the Stephen-Devlin legal moralism and the Mill-Hart liberalism which is centred on the harm principle, and render the limits and difficulties of both positions. Taking these limits and difficulties as the clue, this thesis explores the reason why legal moralists can hardly maintain their position, and argues that Ronald Dworkin''s liberalism theory provides better solution to the question of the legal enforcement of morality with coherent and profound arguments.
Chapter two focuses on the analysis and criticisms of the legal moralism theory held by James Fitzjames Stephen and Lord Patrick Devlin, and points out the difficulties confronted by the legal moralism in general. Chapter three turns to review the liberalism centred on the harm principle which is supported by John Stuart Mill and H.L.A. Hart, and the criticisms of the harm principle. Chapter four intends to reconsider the criticisms of both legal moralism and liberalism in previous chapters , and re-evaluate both positions with the reply from contemporary theorists. In conclusion, this thesis points out the reason why legal moralists can hardly maintain their position, and argues that Ronald Dworkin''s liberalism theory which provides better solution to the question of the legal enforcement of morality.
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