The Influences of Ownership Structure on Corporate Cash Value in Taiwan Listed Firms

• Main Authors: HUANG, HSIAO-CHU, 黃筱筑
• Other Authors: CHAN, MIN-LEE
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/d5525j

碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 財務金融學系 === 106 === This study explores the impact of shareholding structure on value of cash holding and corporate performance using the listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2016. The empirical results show that corporate cash value will be significantly lower in firms with pyramid ownership structure than that in companies without it. Moreover, the stronger deviation between cash flow right and voting right, the significantly higher value of cash. This may be due to the prevailing fact that family-controlled companies that voting power is much greater than the cash flow claim right account for the majority of Taiwan listed firms. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s "convergence of interests hypothesis", this deviation between cash flow right and voting rights may positively enhance the company's cash value. The empirical results also show that holding excess cash will still have a negative impact on company performance when the company has a pyramid ownership structure. Again, the greater the deviation between cash flow right and voting right, the significantly higher operating performance of excess cash holdings. Except for above, this paper interestedly finds that there is a non-linear relationship between firm value and cash holdings in Taiwanese listed firms, that is, firm value is declinely increased with cash holdings.