The Effect of Earnings Management Incentives on Real Earnings Management

碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 會計學系 === 106 === One of the business objectives of the company is profit maximization. Because the purpose of the investment of its shareholders , internal and external stakeholders want to obtain benefits from the investee, the company hopes to obtain the maximum interests by means...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHU, I-CHIEH, 朱怡潔
Other Authors: HSU, YUEH-YU
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2018
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/732y58
Description
Summary:碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 會計學系 === 106 === One of the business objectives of the company is profit maximization. Because the purpose of the investment of its shareholders , internal and external stakeholders want to obtain benefits from the investee, the company hopes to obtain the maximum interests by means of operating, investing and financing activities. On the one hand, The company can attract more investors' funds from outside and also can protect the interests of stakeholders. As a result, the operating decisions made by the CEO of the company become very important. There have been many previous studies exploring the causes of earnings management and their internal relationships with CEOs, both of which indicate that CEOs indeed to use earnings manipulation because of their business-related interests. Therefore, this study uses the data of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2015, The effects of changes in variable compensations (cash dividends, stock dividends, stock options, and the sum of the three) held by CEOs on their degree of real earnings management and earnings smoothing , as well as whether there is any difference in real earnings management under the condition of the level of earnings volatility. In addition, this study also included that operational complexity of companys into additional tests, to explore whether operational complexity will affect the degree of CEO’s earnings management or earnings smoothing.