| Summary: | 碩士 === 亞洲大學 === 財務金融學系 === 106 === This thesis investigates the effect of executive compensation structure, particularly, the ratio of pension fund to total compensations on corporate performances such as returns on total assets (ROA) and stock returns. The compensation structure of managers is an important incentive to their financial decisions in a corporation, for example, investments, financing policies and leverage levels are decided by the risk attitude of managers. Thus, compensation structure affects managers’ risk-taking behavior and then has an impact on firm policies and operating performance.
Adopting listed and over-the-counter firms during 2008 and 2017 in Taiwan, this study finds that higher managers’ compensation leverage relative to firm leverage has a significantly negative impact on firm performance. In addition, the negative effect of compensation leverage on corporate performance, especially stock returns, is less significant during the financial crisis in 2008 comparing with non-financial crisis period in the sample.
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