CEO Succession and Loan Contract Terms

• Main Authors: Jia-Min Sun, 孫家敏
• Other Authors: Hsiang-Ping Tsai
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/572jby

碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程) === 106 === This paper examines the relation between CEO succession and loan contract. According to Parrino(1997), CEO turnover is classified as forced out and voluntary. Compared to the voluntary, forced turnover may be encountering operating problems. Therefore, the bank may restrict the loan contract after CEO succession. Furthermore, if the firms do not find the successor to replace the predecessor immediately, it means the firms do not prepare the succession planning completely. It is a negative information to the bank, who will be conservative when agreeing and to sign the loan contract after the CEO succession. To sum up, the bank could monitor the firm by restricting the loan contract to make the firm be better.