Regulatory Restrictions on Merger and Acquisition of Cable System Operators and News Broadcasting Companies Revisited

• Main Authors: Lee, Jia-Lin, 李佳玲
• Other Authors: Tseng, Kuo-Feng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xhqy5s

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 傳播學院碩士在職專班 === 107 === Merger and acquisition(M&A) activity in Taiwan’s media industry has picked up momentum in the context of digital convergence and sharing economy. A cable TV operator usually holds a monopoly in the local market and is affiliated to a multiple system operator (MSO). The news channels carried by the cable TV operators are the main information sources. Therefore, the regulatory authority in Taiwan tends to take structural regulation approach to forbid the M&A activities when it comes to cable television systems and news broadcasting companies. For this reason, there are regulatory biases such as a lack of coherent standards and tailor-made regulatory repertoire. After reviewing the backdrop of domestic merger and acquisition of cable television systems and news broadcasting companies, relevant issues and the regulatory authority’s theory and practice of media policy and regulation, this thesis hypothesizes that in consideration of facilitating fair market competition and protecting public interest, the regulatory authority makes situated and conditional decisions to restrict the abuse of monopoly power and the content market failure followed. However, by going through the considering process of several M&A cases, the preliminary finding is focused on the regulatory biases and the problems caused. In the aim to provide policy suggestion for future media regulation, a qualitative research method with in-depth interviews was employed in this research. This thesis proposes the following major findings: 1) the regulatory authority is advised to conduct intensive survey on the influence of competitors in audience marketplace and specify criteria and indicators on how the M&A deals would be considered; 2) When the M&A activity is the cause or effect of the abuse of media monopoly power (e.g. cable TV operator or MSO arbitrarily decides which channels can be televised or authorized by their own broadcasting system and causes media content market failure.) and the content market failure followed, the application of such deals should be overruled; 3) from the perspective of behavioral regulation, the application of M&A deal has the chance to be approved only if the obligation of market leader assured and the purpose of sound regulation achieved. As far as the governmental goal of facilitating fair competition, protecting public interest and stimulating media industry development is concerned, the thesis suggests that the regulatory authority put in much effort to create and reinforce a fairly competitive policy environment and enhance the dexterity in reading and analyzing data and information.