The study of avoiding the list of self-interested board of directors-Evidence from different earnings management methods
碩士 === 國立臺北商業大學 === 會計財稅研究所 === 107 === This study examines whether self-interested board of directors in loss companies has more accrual-based earnings management or real earnings management to avoid re-listing in the next period. The empirical results show that: In order to avoid being listed on t...
Main Authors: | , |
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Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2019
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8679t6 |
Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北商業大學 === 會計財稅研究所 === 107 === This study examines whether self-interested board of directors in loss companies has more accrual-based earnings management or real earnings management to avoid re-listing in the next period. The empirical results show that: In order to avoid being listed on the list of self-interested board of directors in the next period,self-interested board of directors tend to use accrual-based earnings management to increase earnings instead of using real earnings management.Probably because compared to accrual-based Earnings management, real earnings management has a negative impact on future cash flows and will hurt the company in the long run, so companies only choose accrual-based earnings management.
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