A study of the necessity of Referendum system

• Main Authors: Mu-Fu Tsai, 蔡牧甫
• Other Authors: 李建良
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/t9w487

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 法律學研究所 === 107 === In order to avoid the dilemma that must be encountered in social science research which is value judgements shall vary from person to person while demonstrating the necessity of the referendum system, this study attempts to use the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA), the net present value method (NPV), the Benefit-Cost ratio, (BCR), and internal rate of return (IRR) as the test tools. When NPV > 0, there is a potential Pareto improvement. This study attempts to use the cost-benefit analysis (CBA)in the regulatory impact analysis (RIA), the net present value method (NPV) , the Benefit-Cost ratio, (BCR), and internal rate of return(IRR)as the test tools. When NPV > 0, it indicates that there is potential Pareto improvement, which means the present value of the net benefit expressed by the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle is positive, and it shows that regulations, policies or public investments are worth being taken.(Briefly, the larger the NPV is, the more worthwhile it is); on the other hand, when NPV < 0, it shows that it is detrimental to social welfare, regulations, policies or public investment, are not worth being taken; when B/C>1, regulations, policies or public investment are worthwhile; when the internal rate of return (λ) is greater than the social discount rate (r), the rules, policies, or public investments are worthwhile; this study also makes use of Riker and Ordeshook''s well-known “calculus of voting” R=BP-C+D. Through this research, we are allowed to understand what the "R value" of the implementation of the referendum system (the reward effect after the referendum proposal is put into practice) is; moreover, this study provides with a chance to analyze what B value (whether the difference in interest, that is, the difference between the individual''s preference and the risk of passing the disgusting issue), P value (the probability of bringing this interest gap), C value (the cost of implementing a referendum on a single individual) , and D value (citizen duty , citizen efficacy) are. In this way, we are able to find the BP value, C value and D value in the referendum system. First, when the R value is greater than zero, it is reasonable to put the proposal into the referendum; if the R value is less than zero, it is unreasonable to put the proposal into the referendum. Second, if it is assumed that the R value of each referendum can be counted, when the R value is greater than zero, it is rational for Taiwan to continue to promote the referendum system; when the R value is less than zero, it is irrational for Taiwan to continue to promote the referendum system. This study presents positive and negative arguments about the referendum system via literature review. Then, through the questionnaire, we utilize the WTP method to ask the public "How much are you willing to pay for the establishment of the referendum system?" Furthermore, we discuss whether Taiwan should keep promoting the referendum. It is believed that the Control Yuan could be set up as an independent RIA agency from the central government system to assess the necessity of national regulations. Finally, through mathematical calculations, the referendum jury system designed in this study appears to be the most beneficial method with the lowest cost, the least violation, and the most necessity.