| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 法律學研究所 === 107 === Two-sided platforms serve two distinct but interdependent groups of customers who rely on the platform to connect them to each other, and the demand from one group of customers depends on the demand from the other group. Indirect network effects exist across the groups of consumers. The pricing structure of a platform—the way prices are distributed between consumers on the two sides of the platform—is an important feature different from that of other business models. The key role of two-sided platforms is to coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers. The business model, operational problems needing to be solved, competitive constraints, price elasticities of demand, and the profit-maximizing strategies, the value creation of two-sided platforms are different from that of traditional one-sided firms. However, conventional wisdom and traditional analytical tools in the field of competition law and experiences on competition law enforcement are derived basically from the one-sided business model. Applying one-sided logic to two-sided platforms while overlooking the two-sided nature might lead to false positives or false negatives which are harmful to markets and always need to be avoided. For the purpose of preventing such negative results, it is necessary to identify the differences between two-sided businesses and one-sided businesses.
This thesis begins with a review of the theory of two-sided markets and the theoretical evolution of network effects and examines the economics of two-sided platforms. Secondly, this thesis applies the economics of two-sided markets to several areas of competition law, including market definition, analysis of market power, competitive effects of mergers, predatory pricing, and effects of vertical restraints to demonstrate the differences between two-sided platforms and one-sided firms and illustrate how to adapt analytical approaches to the cases involving two-sided platforms and what should be taken into consideration in the analysis of platforms. Lastly, this thesis examines the explanatory guidelines involving two-sided markets released by the competent authorities, the relevant laws in several jurisdictions, and the decisions involving two-sided markets made by Taiwan Fair Trade Commission to analyze the differences between theories and practices. The findings of this thesis are summarized into useful recommendations for competition law enforcement.
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