An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 107 === It is routine for city government who allocates sidewalk maintenance outlays to each village. In theory, the ruling party should give appropriate sidewalk resources according to the demands of each administrative region. However, in partical, some loopholes may e...
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ndltd-TW-107NTU052270162019-06-27T05:48:11Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7j87f4 An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 臺北市人行道維修支出的政治分配-以101-102年為例 Ya-Hui Tang 湯雅惠 碩士 國立臺灣大學 政治學研究所 107 It is routine for city government who allocates sidewalk maintenance outlays to each village. In theory, the ruling party should give appropriate sidewalk resources according to the demands of each administrative region. However, in partical, some loopholes may exist. For example, councilors are likely to provide more sidewalk resources for their stronghold to get extra political benefits. In order to server the public, village chief will also seek more sidewalk maintenance outlays of the city government. This research is base on the theory of distributive politics. The previous studies showed that the ruling party would more likely to give more resource as feedbacks to their stronghold. To use case-study method to find out the distribution behavior of the politician. This study is to verify whether the ruling party actually give more maintenance outlays to the stronghold area by statistic analysis. It is worth noting that both councilors and villiage chiefs are involved in the distribution process. It is worthy to study the behaviors among the three parties. There are several interesting points are found in this research. First, only a few councilors tend to distribute more resources to their stronghold. Secondly, ruling party is not as expected, that they do not distribute more sidewalk maintenance outlays to the stronghold they owned. Thirdly, the objective demands, in the other hands, are the most important reason for the government to detemine where to allocate sidewalk maintenance outlays. In conclusion, in the Taipei City Government, no specific political distribution behaviors are found on the sidewalk maintenance outlays. Hong-Wung,Wang 王宏文 2018 學位論文 ; thesis 84 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 107 === It is routine for city government who allocates sidewalk maintenance outlays to each village. In theory, the ruling party should give appropriate sidewalk resources according to the demands of each administrative region. However, in partical, some loopholes may exist. For example, councilors are likely to provide more sidewalk resources for their stronghold to get extra political benefits. In order to server the public, village chief will also seek more sidewalk maintenance outlays of the city government.
This research is base on the theory of distributive politics. The previous studies showed that the ruling party would more likely to give more resource as feedbacks to their stronghold. To use case-study method to find out the distribution behavior of the politician.
This study is to verify whether the ruling party actually give more maintenance outlays to the stronghold area by statistic analysis. It is worth noting that both councilors and villiage chiefs are involved in the distribution process. It is worthy to study the behaviors among the three parties.
There are several interesting points are found in this research. First, only a few councilors tend to distribute more resources to their stronghold. Secondly, ruling party is not as expected, that they do not distribute more sidewalk maintenance outlays to the stronghold they owned. Thirdly, the objective demands, in the other hands, are the most important reason for the government to detemine where to allocate sidewalk maintenance outlays.
In conclusion, in the Taipei City Government, no specific political distribution behaviors are found on the sidewalk maintenance outlays.
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author2 |
Hong-Wung,Wang |
author_facet |
Hong-Wung,Wang Ya-Hui Tang 湯雅惠 |
author |
Ya-Hui Tang 湯雅惠 |
spellingShingle |
Ya-Hui Tang 湯雅惠 An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 |
author_sort |
Ya-Hui Tang |
title |
An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 |
title_short |
An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 |
title_full |
An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 |
title_fullStr |
An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 |
title_full_unstemmed |
An Empirical Study on the Distribution of City Sidewalk Maintenance Outlays in Taipei City during 2012-2013 |
title_sort |
empirical study on the distribution of city sidewalk maintenance outlays in taipei city during 2012-2013 |
publishDate |
2018 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7j87f4 |
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