Deviation of Land Policy Implementation in China’s Grass-roots Regimes——A Case Study of Rural Collective Land Used for Construction

• Main Authors: GU XIAOTING, 古曉婷
• Other Authors: Chao,Chien-Min
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/zczybe

博士 === 中國文化大學 === 國家發展與中國大陸研究所博士班 === 107 === This paper focuses on the interest structure of rural township governance over land rights transfer in Mainland China from the view of a state-business theory. The core interests of a rural township ruling authority are composed of two items: profit transfer and profit structure. This paper suggests that rural township governments have changed from being “blind buyers” to becoming “senior rational investors”; their attitude toward markets has shifted from the explorative stage of “crossing a river by feeling one’s way over the stones” to the GDP first stage, and then to the stage of cautious and rational money management. Land rights transfers in rural townships provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs to seek their self-interest, for rural township governments to seek economic interests, for government-business relationship to seek rent-seeking interests, and for government departments to seek departmental interests. Based on the protection of cultivated land, the central government requires local governments to implement relevant policies of "increase or decrease linkage". This study points out the contradiction of the policy in detail, including the contradiction between the allocation of administrative intervention and market regulation, the contradiction between the distribution of land resources and the contradiction of the distribution of land income. This study also points out that many contradictions inevitably lead to deviations in execution. Because of the lack, dislocation, emptiness and contradiction of the institutional environment of the land policy, when the local government implements the central policy, the local government will respond to the central policy by flexibility, objection, low efficiency, selective execution, pseudo execution, suspension, or inversion.