Dividend policy and earnings management: The moderating role of CEO power

碩士 === 國立臺北科技大學 === 資訊與財金管理系 === 107 === This study aims at analyzing the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management. Also, we’re especially interested in whether the relationship changes under the influence of CEO power. Our result shows that dividend-paying firms are less incline...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: You-Ru Feng, 馮攸如
Other Authors: Wei-Peng Chen
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2019
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/m4nnb4
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立臺北科技大學 === 資訊與財金管理系 === 107 === This study aims at analyzing the relationship between dividend policy and earnings management. Also, we’re especially interested in whether the relationship changes under the influence of CEO power. Our result shows that dividend-paying firms are less inclined to perform earnings management, and vice versa. This phenomenon may indicate that firms would pay dividends to tackle the proxy issues from investor and enhance corporate reputation. Besides, for firms with high CEO power, they tend to manipulate earnings management if they’re not paying dividends. As a result, those company with high CEO power should leverage dividend paying to counteract earnings management, so as to enhance the quality of disclosed earnings quality and demonstrate better corporate image.