Quality provision in duopoly
This dissertation comprises three essays revisiting the classical topic of quality provision in a duopoly. Two essays consider a situation in which consumers cannot identify the origin of an individual product but observe or infer the average quality of the units brought to the market: Chapter 2 stu...
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| Format: | Doctoral Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S)
2006
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| Online Access: | http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-495 http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:isbn:91-7258-704-0 |
| Summary: | This dissertation comprises three essays revisiting the classical topic of quality provision in a duopoly. Two essays consider a situation in which consumers cannot identify the origin of an individual product but observe or infer the average quality of the units brought to the market: Chapter 2 studies the case where the two producers bargain over a minimum quality standard before deciding about their own quality level, while Chapter 3 deals with the case where qualities are (exogenously) fixed and producers have to decide about the quantity they will offer for sale. The final essay (Chapter 4) switches to a perfect-information environment and asks whether the producer of an inferior variety is able to deter the entry of a superior product by having retailers sign onto exclusivity contracts. === Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006 |
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