| Summary: | The decision of the European Commission to block the merger between Volvo and Scania in the late 90’s became the starting point to the debate of the possible discriminating effects of the European merger regulation. Especially since the Commission a few years earlier had approved of the merger between Mercedes-Benz and Kässbohrer on the German bus market, where the conditions for competition had been similar to those at hand in the Swedish case. The issue that was and still is in focus is whether the European merger regulation is more difficult to pass for large companies situated on a smaller domestic market than is the case for their competitors of corresponding size but situated on a larger domestic market. This thesis aims at examining what the judgement of the geographical relevant market means for the application of the Merger act. This is being done from two perspectives. Firstly how the geographical criterion affects large merging companies situated on a relatively small domestic market and secondly how it affects a member state like Sweden, which is so dependent on its large companies. The purpose of this thesis also opens for a discussion of how rigid the merger control can be in an open market economy. The company perspective of the purpose is being pursued in two studies of the merger cases Volvo-Scania and Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer, being four national champs with differing size of domestic markets. The member state angle considers the smaller state dependence on its large companies and if that dependence itself creates a disadvantage in a merger case. The end of the purpose opens for a common discussion of the legitimacy of merger control in an open market economy. After analysing these aspects the thesis concludes that the geographical criterion makes it impossible for large companies with a relatively small domestic market to merge when a market bears the stamp of brand loyalty. Considering the small member state the conclusion is that the European merger control offers both pros and cons for consumers and that smaller states would be better off with a more producer-oriented merger law. The ending conclusion questions the Merger act as an intervening tool because of its arbitrary aspect depending on which composition the Commission has when a merger is announced.
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