Comparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced Linux

To minimize the damage in the event of a security breach it is desirable to limit the privileges of remotely available services to the bare minimum and to isolate the individual services from the rest of the operating system. To achieve this there is a number of different containment strategies and...

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Main Authors: Eriksson, Magnus, Palmroos, Staffan
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för datavetenskap 2007
Subjects:
Online Access:http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-9078
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spelling ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-liu-90782018-01-14T05:13:54ZComparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced LinuxengEriksson, MagnusPalmroos, StaffanLinköpings universitet, Institutionen för datavetenskapLinköpings universitet, Institutionen för datavetenskapInstitutionen för datavetenskap2007Solaris ZonesSolaris ContainersSELinuxcontainment strategiesvirtualizationComputer SciencesDatavetenskap (datalogi)To minimize the damage in the event of a security breach it is desirable to limit the privileges of remotely available services to the bare minimum and to isolate the individual services from the rest of the operating system. To achieve this there is a number of different containment strategies and process privilege security models that may be used. Two of these mechanisms are Solaris Containers (a.k.a. Solaris Zones) and Type Enforcement, as implemented in the Fedora distribution of Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux). This thesis compares how these technologies can be used to isolate a single service in the operating system. As these two technologies differ significantly we have examined how the isolation effect can be achieved in two separate experiments. In the Solaris experiments we show how the footprint of the installed zone can be reduced and how to minimize the runtime overhead associated with the zone. To demonstrate SELinux we create a deliberately flawed network daemon and show how this can be isolated by writing a SELinux policy. We demonstrate how both technologies can be used to achieve isolation for a single service. Differences between the two technologies become apparent when trying to run multiple instances of the same service where the SELinux implementation suffers from lack of namespace isolation. When using zones the administration work is the same regardless of the services running in the zone whereas SELinux requires a separate policy for each service. If a policy is not available from the operating system vendor the administrator needs to be familiar with the SELinux policy framework and create the policy from scratch. The overhead of the technologies is small and is not a critical factor for the scalability of a system using them. Student thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesistexthttp://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-9078application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Solaris Zones
Solaris Containers
SELinux
containment strategies
virtualization
Computer Sciences
Datavetenskap (datalogi)
spellingShingle Solaris Zones
Solaris Containers
SELinux
containment strategies
virtualization
Computer Sciences
Datavetenskap (datalogi)
Eriksson, Magnus
Palmroos, Staffan
Comparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced Linux
description To minimize the damage in the event of a security breach it is desirable to limit the privileges of remotely available services to the bare minimum and to isolate the individual services from the rest of the operating system. To achieve this there is a number of different containment strategies and process privilege security models that may be used. Two of these mechanisms are Solaris Containers (a.k.a. Solaris Zones) and Type Enforcement, as implemented in the Fedora distribution of Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux). This thesis compares how these technologies can be used to isolate a single service in the operating system. As these two technologies differ significantly we have examined how the isolation effect can be achieved in two separate experiments. In the Solaris experiments we show how the footprint of the installed zone can be reduced and how to minimize the runtime overhead associated with the zone. To demonstrate SELinux we create a deliberately flawed network daemon and show how this can be isolated by writing a SELinux policy. We demonstrate how both technologies can be used to achieve isolation for a single service. Differences between the two technologies become apparent when trying to run multiple instances of the same service where the SELinux implementation suffers from lack of namespace isolation. When using zones the administration work is the same regardless of the services running in the zone whereas SELinux requires a separate policy for each service. If a policy is not available from the operating system vendor the administrator needs to be familiar with the SELinux policy framework and create the policy from scratch. The overhead of the technologies is small and is not a critical factor for the scalability of a system using them.
author Eriksson, Magnus
Palmroos, Staffan
author_facet Eriksson, Magnus
Palmroos, Staffan
author_sort Eriksson, Magnus
title Comparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced Linux
title_short Comparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced Linux
title_full Comparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced Linux
title_fullStr Comparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced Linux
title_full_unstemmed Comparative Study of Containment Strategies in Solaris and Security Enhanced Linux
title_sort comparative study of containment strategies in solaris and security enhanced linux
publisher Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för datavetenskap
publishDate 2007
url http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-9078
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