| Summary: | Abstract This paper examines the Copenhagen Climate Conference held in the Bella Center in Copenhagen, December 2009. The aim of this paper was to analyse the highly anticipated conference, and why it did not result in a binding protocol between the world’s states. The focus of this paper was to examine two key actors in the Copenhagen negotiations: the people’s republic of China and the European Union. These two actors were analysed by using Elinor Ostroms nobel prize winning theories on how to make common pool resources function. The method used to compare China and the EU was the qualitative text analysis; the texts that were analysed are official documents from the parts respective websites, as well as a number of second hand sources, such as newspaper articles. This paper presents that the EU acted more from a common goods point of view, whereas China acted more out of national interest. Nyckelord: statsvetenskap, EU, Kina, klimatkonferens, Gemensamma resurser, spelteori, Elinor Ostrom.
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