Dangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelism

Why do some elections spark violence whilst others do not? That is a question that has gained increased interest from scholars during the last few years. However, because of the field’s relative novelty, and despite the vast literature on democratization and civil war, it is still a question that is...

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Main Author: Forsberg, Erik
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-341453
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spelling ndltd-UPSALLA1-oai-DiVA.org-uu-3414532018-02-14T05:11:04ZDangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelismengForsberg, ErikUppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning2018ClientelismelectionviolenceinstitutionelectionsinstitutionspatronageclientsconflictinstitutionvotepeaceAfricasub-SaharandemocracydemocratizationquantitativeOther Social Sciences not elsewhere specifiedÖvrig annan samhällsvetenskapWhy do some elections spark violence whilst others do not? That is a question that has gained increased interest from scholars during the last few years. However, because of the field’s relative novelty, and despite the vast literature on democratization and civil war, it is still a question that is not fully comprehended. In this thesis, a theory claiming that clientelism should increase the risk of electoral violence is presented. It is argued that clientelism increases the stakes of elections by increasing the costs of losing and the rewards of winning them. This should also increase the risk that electoral violence is employed as a strategy in elections. It is further argued that this relationship should be present both when an incumbent is partaking in the election and when no incumbent does so. It is further argued that violence both prior to and after elections should correlate positively with clientelism. The theory is tested by a series of regression models. It is found that clientelism only has a consistently positive and statistical significant relationship with post-election violence. Furthermore, evidence is found disproving the hypothesis that electoral violence is positively correlated with clientelism regardless of whether an incumbent partakes in the election or not. On the other hand, evidence is found that a condition for the proposed theoretical mechanism is that an incumbent is running for office. The thesis contributes to the knowledge about electoral violence in general, but also to the vast literature on democratization in Africa. Student thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesistexthttp://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-341453application/pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Clientelism
election
violence
institution
elections
institutions
patronage
clients
conflict
institution
vote
peace
Africa
sub-Saharan
democracy
democratization
quantitative
Other Social Sciences not elsewhere specified
Övrig annan samhällsvetenskap
spellingShingle Clientelism
election
violence
institution
elections
institutions
patronage
clients
conflict
institution
vote
peace
Africa
sub-Saharan
democracy
democratization
quantitative
Other Social Sciences not elsewhere specified
Övrig annan samhällsvetenskap
Forsberg, Erik
Dangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelism
description Why do some elections spark violence whilst others do not? That is a question that has gained increased interest from scholars during the last few years. However, because of the field’s relative novelty, and despite the vast literature on democratization and civil war, it is still a question that is not fully comprehended. In this thesis, a theory claiming that clientelism should increase the risk of electoral violence is presented. It is argued that clientelism increases the stakes of elections by increasing the costs of losing and the rewards of winning them. This should also increase the risk that electoral violence is employed as a strategy in elections. It is further argued that this relationship should be present both when an incumbent is partaking in the election and when no incumbent does so. It is further argued that violence both prior to and after elections should correlate positively with clientelism. The theory is tested by a series of regression models. It is found that clientelism only has a consistently positive and statistical significant relationship with post-election violence. Furthermore, evidence is found disproving the hypothesis that electoral violence is positively correlated with clientelism regardless of whether an incumbent partakes in the election or not. On the other hand, evidence is found that a condition for the proposed theoretical mechanism is that an incumbent is running for office. The thesis contributes to the knowledge about electoral violence in general, but also to the vast literature on democratization in Africa.
author Forsberg, Erik
author_facet Forsberg, Erik
author_sort Forsberg, Erik
title Dangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelism
title_short Dangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelism
title_full Dangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelism
title_fullStr Dangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelism
title_full_unstemmed Dangerous elections : A study on electoral violence and clientelism
title_sort dangerous elections : a study on electoral violence and clientelism
publisher Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning
publishDate 2018
url http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-341453
work_keys_str_mv AT forsbergerik dangerouselectionsastudyonelectoralviolenceandclientelism
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