Problems for Michael Gill’s semantic pluralism : The ostensibility of certain moral agreements and disagreements
This paper concerns the semantic branch of meta-ethics, and examines a version of so called semantic pluralism advocated by Michael Gill. Briefly put, Gill suggests that ordinary people’s usage of moral terms is rather messy in the sense that the meaning of moral terms can vary not only between diff...
Main Author: | Engström, Simon |
---|---|
Format: | Others |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen
2020
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-410270 |
Similar Items
-
Sinnott-Armstrong on intuitionism
by: Hebert, Jamie
Published: (2013) -
Sinnott-Armstrong on intuitionism
by: Hebert, Jamie
Published: (2013) -
Huemers moraliska realism och 'argumentet från oenighet'
by: Karlsson, Patrik
Published: (2007) -
Non-cognitivism and thick moral concepts
by: Blomberg, Olle
Published: (2006) -
The ordinary and extraordinary landscape: the relational city in a multicentered Society
by: Pauls, Meaghan
Published: (2016)