| Summary: | We investigate how the evolution of ownership structure affects corporate financial and operating performance and corporate strategies. In particular, we study whether the shift in control rights away from the dominant shareholder mitigates agency problems and accordingly expropriation of minority investors by the controlling shareholder. More specifically, does the increase in power of the second large shareholder manifest in the firm’s operating and financial performance, and financing and operating strategies? Using ownership data for 1996 and 2008 representing 403 firms from nine East Asian countries, we find strong and robust evidence that the change in the voting rights of the second largest shareholder over these twelve years is associated with higher firm valuation, better operating performance, better access to long term financing, more efficient operation management strategies and a higher dividend payout ratio. Consistent with prior literature that finds multiple large shareholders play an internal governance role and mitigate agency problems, our findings imply that an increase in the voting rights of the second large shareholder improves firm’s corporate governance and mitigates agency problems consequently increasing firm performance and improving strategies.
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