SEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements

This dissertation investigates whether firms strategically disclose accounting restatements by coordinating restatement announcements with earnings releases, delaying the announcement of income-decreasing restatements, or obscuring restatement announcements by failing to disclose news of a restateme...

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Main Author: Sharp, Nathan Young, 1977-
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: 2008
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/2152/3302
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spelling ndltd-UTEXAS-oai-repositories.lib.utexas.edu-2152-33022015-09-20T16:51:56ZSEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatementsSharp, Nathan Young, 1977-Financial statements--United StatesCorporations--United States--FinanceThis dissertation investigates whether firms strategically disclose accounting restatements by coordinating restatement announcements with earnings releases, delaying the announcement of income-decreasing restatements, or obscuring restatement announcements by failing to disclose news of a restatement on a Form 8-K filing. I examine restatements announced after a Securities and Exchange Commission rule (effective August 24, 2004) that mandates a unique 8-K filing for restatements. Consistent with an attempt to lessen the negative impact of a restatement announcement, I find that when firms package restatement announcements with earnings releases they most often pair small income-decreasing restatements with positive earnings surprises. I also find that monitoring by the SEC decreases the probability of firms' mixing restatement and earnings news. On average, firms delay announcements of income-decreasing restatements longer than announcements of income-increasing restatements, and institutional ownership is positively associated with more timely disclosures of restatement news. I show that firms with weak corporate governance or less external monitoring are more likely to make news of a restatement difficult to find. Restatements performed without a Form 8-K filing are much less likely to be disclosed in a company-issued press release or to receive attention in the business press, and I find some evidence that the initial market reaction to obscure restatement announcements is less negative than the reaction to restatements disclosed transparently. Collectively, these results suggest that even in the presence of strict disclosure requirements, some firms attempt to strategically manage the timing and transparency of restatement announcements and investors do not appear to undo the effects of firms' strategic behavior.text2008-08-28T23:39:50Z2008-08-28T23:39:50Z20072008-08-28T23:39:50ZThesiselectronicb68900569http://hdl.handle.net/2152/3302174291903engCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Financial statements--United States
Corporations--United States--Finance
spellingShingle Financial statements--United States
Corporations--United States--Finance
Sharp, Nathan Young, 1977-
SEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements
description This dissertation investigates whether firms strategically disclose accounting restatements by coordinating restatement announcements with earnings releases, delaying the announcement of income-decreasing restatements, or obscuring restatement announcements by failing to disclose news of a restatement on a Form 8-K filing. I examine restatements announced after a Securities and Exchange Commission rule (effective August 24, 2004) that mandates a unique 8-K filing for restatements. Consistent with an attempt to lessen the negative impact of a restatement announcement, I find that when firms package restatement announcements with earnings releases they most often pair small income-decreasing restatements with positive earnings surprises. I also find that monitoring by the SEC decreases the probability of firms' mixing restatement and earnings news. On average, firms delay announcements of income-decreasing restatements longer than announcements of income-increasing restatements, and institutional ownership is positively associated with more timely disclosures of restatement news. I show that firms with weak corporate governance or less external monitoring are more likely to make news of a restatement difficult to find. Restatements performed without a Form 8-K filing are much less likely to be disclosed in a company-issued press release or to receive attention in the business press, and I find some evidence that the initial market reaction to obscure restatement announcements is less negative than the reaction to restatements disclosed transparently. Collectively, these results suggest that even in the presence of strict disclosure requirements, some firms attempt to strategically manage the timing and transparency of restatement announcements and investors do not appear to undo the effects of firms' strategic behavior. === text
author Sharp, Nathan Young, 1977-
author_facet Sharp, Nathan Young, 1977-
author_sort Sharp, Nathan Young, 1977-
title SEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements
title_short SEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements
title_full SEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements
title_fullStr SEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements
title_full_unstemmed SEC regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements
title_sort sec regulation and the strategic disclosure of accounting restatements
publishDate 2008
url http://hdl.handle.net/2152/3302
work_keys_str_mv AT sharpnathanyoung1977 secregulationandthestrategicdisclosureofaccountingrestatements
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