How Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral Realism
Philosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest...
Main Author: | Lennon, James Preston |
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Other Authors: | Philosophy |
Format: | Others |
Published: |
Virginia Tech
2016
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73678 |
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