COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES.

It is argued that an analysis of causation using counterfactual conditionals can be given. Causes and effects are considered to be propositional entities, and a semantics for counterfactuals employing possible worlds is presupposed. The analysis stems from an attempt to handle cases proving problema...

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Main Author: ROSS, GLENN JORGEN.
Language:en
Published: The University of Arizona. 1982
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187947
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spelling ndltd-arizona.edu-oai-arizona.openrepository.com-10150-1879472015-10-23T04:35:23Z COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES. ROSS, GLENN JORGEN. Causation. Counterfactuals (Logic) It is argued that an analysis of causation using counterfactual conditionals can be given. Causes and effects are considered to be propositional entities, and a semantics for counterfactuals employing possible worlds is presupposed. The analysis stems from an attempt to handle cases proving problematic for other counterfactual analyses. Preempted causes, which would have been causes had they not been preempted by causes, are distinguished from causes by requiring that a causal chain connecting cause and effect exist. The condition is strengthened to require that the causal chain still would have existed even had the preempted causes been false. Causal chains are analyzed as sequences of true propositions satisfying two conditions: any member after the first would not have been true had its immediate predecessor alone been false, and the truth of any member of the sequence is sufficient for the truth of any subsequent member. The analysis is weakened slightly to permit many causes to overdetermine an effect. The analysis is then amended to exclude certain noncausal connections. Though it is true that had Socrates not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow, his dying did not cause her to become a widow. To yield this result, an analysis is offered of the relation that logically simple propositions bear to the more complex propositions that they make true. It is then proposed that the sets of simple propositions making the cause and effect true not entail the effect and the cause, respectively. Finally, an attempt is made to distinguish between cause and effect. It is argued that cases of backward causation are possible, and thus no analysis should require causes to be temporally prior to effects. It is proposed that only when there is symmetry with respect to the subjunctive conditions of the analysis should temporal considerations be employed to discriminate cause and effect. 1982 text Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187947 681766783 8217467 en Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. The University of Arizona.
collection NDLTD
language en
sources NDLTD
topic Causation.
Counterfactuals (Logic)
spellingShingle Causation.
Counterfactuals (Logic)
ROSS, GLENN JORGEN.
COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES.
description It is argued that an analysis of causation using counterfactual conditionals can be given. Causes and effects are considered to be propositional entities, and a semantics for counterfactuals employing possible worlds is presupposed. The analysis stems from an attempt to handle cases proving problematic for other counterfactual analyses. Preempted causes, which would have been causes had they not been preempted by causes, are distinguished from causes by requiring that a causal chain connecting cause and effect exist. The condition is strengthened to require that the causal chain still would have existed even had the preempted causes been false. Causal chains are analyzed as sequences of true propositions satisfying two conditions: any member after the first would not have been true had its immediate predecessor alone been false, and the truth of any member of the sequence is sufficient for the truth of any subsequent member. The analysis is weakened slightly to permit many causes to overdetermine an effect. The analysis is then amended to exclude certain noncausal connections. Though it is true that had Socrates not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow, his dying did not cause her to become a widow. To yield this result, an analysis is offered of the relation that logically simple propositions bear to the more complex propositions that they make true. It is then proposed that the sets of simple propositions making the cause and effect true not entail the effect and the cause, respectively. Finally, an attempt is made to distinguish between cause and effect. It is argued that cases of backward causation are possible, and thus no analysis should require causes to be temporally prior to effects. It is proposed that only when there is symmetry with respect to the subjunctive conditions of the analysis should temporal considerations be employed to discriminate cause and effect.
author ROSS, GLENN JORGEN.
author_facet ROSS, GLENN JORGEN.
author_sort ROSS, GLENN JORGEN.
title COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES.
title_short COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES.
title_full COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES.
title_fullStr COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES.
title_full_unstemmed COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSES.
title_sort counterfactuals and causes.
publisher The University of Arizona.
publishDate 1982
url http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187947
work_keys_str_mv AT rossglennjorgen counterfactualsandcauses
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