Delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning

Contemporary theories of causal induction have focussed largely on the question of how evidence in the form of covariations between causes and effects is used to compute measures of causal strength. A very important precursor enabling such computations is that the reasoner notices that a cause and e...

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Main Author: Buehner, Marc
Published: University of Sheffield 2002
Subjects:
153
Online Access:http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.247154
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spelling ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-2471542015-03-19T03:58:01ZDelay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoningBuehner, Marc2002Contemporary theories of causal induction have focussed largely on the question of how evidence in the form of covariations between causes and effects is used to compute measures of causal strength. A very important precursor enabling such computations is that the reasoner notices that a cause and effect have co-occurred. Standard laboratory experiments have usually bypassed this problem by presenting participants directly with covariational information. As a result, relatively little is known about how humans identify causal relations in real time. What evidence exists, however, paints a rather unflattering picture of human causal induction and converges to the conclusion that humans cannot identify causal relations if cause and effect are separated by more than a few seconds. Associative learning theory has interpreted these findings to indicate that temporal contiguity is essential to causal inference. I argue instead that contiguity is not essential, but that the influence of time in causal inference is crucially dependent on people's beliefs and expectations about the timeframe of the causal relation in question. First I demonstrate that humans are capable of dissociating temporal contiguity from causal strength; more specifically, they can learn that a given event exerts a stronger causal influence when it is temporally separated from the effect than when it is contiguous with it. Then I re-investigate a paradigm commonly used to study the effects of delay on human causal induction. My experiments employed one crucial additional manipulation regarding participants' awareness of potential delays. This manipulation was sufficient to reduce the detrimental effects of delay. Three other experiments employed a similar strategy, but relied on implicit instructions about the timeframe of the causal relation in question. Overall, results support the hypothesis that knowledge mediates the timeframe of covariation assessment in human causal induction. Implications for associative learning and causal power theories are discussed.153Associative learningUniversity of Sheffieldhttp://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.247154http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/3418/Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
collection NDLTD
sources NDLTD
topic 153
Associative learning
spellingShingle 153
Associative learning
Buehner, Marc
Delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning
description Contemporary theories of causal induction have focussed largely on the question of how evidence in the form of covariations between causes and effects is used to compute measures of causal strength. A very important precursor enabling such computations is that the reasoner notices that a cause and effect have co-occurred. Standard laboratory experiments have usually bypassed this problem by presenting participants directly with covariational information. As a result, relatively little is known about how humans identify causal relations in real time. What evidence exists, however, paints a rather unflattering picture of human causal induction and converges to the conclusion that humans cannot identify causal relations if cause and effect are separated by more than a few seconds. Associative learning theory has interpreted these findings to indicate that temporal contiguity is essential to causal inference. I argue instead that contiguity is not essential, but that the influence of time in causal inference is crucially dependent on people's beliefs and expectations about the timeframe of the causal relation in question. First I demonstrate that humans are capable of dissociating temporal contiguity from causal strength; more specifically, they can learn that a given event exerts a stronger causal influence when it is temporally separated from the effect than when it is contiguous with it. Then I re-investigate a paradigm commonly used to study the effects of delay on human causal induction. My experiments employed one crucial additional manipulation regarding participants' awareness of potential delays. This manipulation was sufficient to reduce the detrimental effects of delay. Three other experiments employed a similar strategy, but relied on implicit instructions about the timeframe of the causal relation in question. Overall, results support the hypothesis that knowledge mediates the timeframe of covariation assessment in human causal induction. Implications for associative learning and causal power theories are discussed.
author Buehner, Marc
author_facet Buehner, Marc
author_sort Buehner, Marc
title Delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning
title_short Delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning
title_full Delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning
title_fullStr Delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning
title_full_unstemmed Delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning
title_sort delay and knowledge mediation in human causal reasoning
publisher University of Sheffield
publishDate 2002
url http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.247154
work_keys_str_mv AT buehnermarc delayandknowledgemediationinhumancausalreasoning
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