The question of security in British foreign policy, 1920-1926

The subject is the formation of official British policy on international security between the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles and Germany's entry into the League of Nations, and defence policy in relation to foreign policy. The problem of security in these years, for Britain, falls...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Orde, Anne
Published: Durham University 1972
Subjects:
Online Access:http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.467729
Description
Summary:The subject is the formation of official British policy on international security between the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles and Germany's entry into the League of Nations, and defence policy in relation to foreign policy. The problem of security in these years, for Britain, falls into three parts: international security in the broadest sense; the security of areas of the world of importance to Britain and the Empire; and the security of Britain and the Empire itself. International security in the broadest sense was largely a matter of the development of the League of Nations, The attitude of British Governments to the obligations of the Covenant and the rejection of the attempts of 1922-24 to give them greater precision, are shown to have been much influenced by the abstention of the United States from membership of the League and by the position of the Dominions, In terms of "foreign policy the areas of greatest importance for regional security were western Europe and the Far East, The problem of western European security is traced from the unsuccessful negotiations of 1921-22 for an Anglo-French pact to the apparent solution at Locarno; that of the Far East from the early discussion of the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance through the Washington Conference to the problems of developing the Singapore base. Defence policy was, it is shown, more closely related to foreign policy in the Far East than in Europe, The security of France and Belgium was generally regarded as a British interest; but danger was nowhere imminent and economy was a paramount consideration. The solutions sought were political rather than military: no commitment was undertaken in the Far East; and when Britain finally accepted one in Western Europe no provision for its fulfilment was considered.