| Summary: | This thesis adds to the ongoing accounting and financial literature by investigating the determinants and economic effects of corporate disclosure in a low disclosure environment – the two Chinese stock markets. It examines two research questions: whether the imposition of exogenously-imported corporate governance legislation and international accounting standards (IAS) lead to a fundamental improvement of corporate disclosure practices; and the estimation risk perspective of whether increased corporate disclosure results in a lower cost of equity capital through reducing the risk premiums on information uncertainty on firm-special characteristics. Results for the first question demonstrate that, while corporate disclosure is increased over time, neither advanced corporate governance mechanisms nor the IAS facilitate material improvement in voluntary disclosure. Instead, the ownership structure, especially foreign-ownership, seems to play a more essential role in determining companies’ disclosure practices. In regards to the second research question, this thesis shows stock prices of listed Chinese companies are largely informational inefficient, and that, under this circumstance, the level of corporate disclosure is strongly negatively associated with stock return volatilities. This negative association appears to result from the high-margin decrease in information asymmetry on firm-special characteristics when listed companies increase mandatory disclosure. This finding therefore provides further country-level evidence in support of the view that the extent of negative association between corporate disclosure and the cost of equity capital is primarily dependent upon the features of stock markets and the disclosure environment in different nations. This thesis concludes with recommendations for the Chinese government and the market regulator, the China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC), to fundamentally improve current political and legal systems and to effectively enforce the mandatory disclosure legislation.
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