Disagreement and semantic relativity : the case of aesthetic discourse

• Main Author: Baker, Carl Edward
• Published: University of Leeds 2012
• Subjects: 100
• Online Access: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.589057

In this work I aim to explore the role of disagreement (a) in recent semantic debates between aesthetic relativism and its rivals, and Cb) in semantic theory more generally. I argue that faultless disagreement does not, as some have argued, push us towards aesthetic relativism-and that while relativists in fact have trouble accounting for some aspects of the faultlessness data, aesthetic absolutists can develop a theory which accounts for this data. I argue while arguments from disagreement against contextualism and .relativism fail to rule out those positions, they do show (a) that contextualists and relativists require controversial assumptions to make sense of widespread aesthetic disagreement and Cb) that the best relativist account of disagreement and the best relativist account of faultlessness are in tension with one another. I argue that the project of giving arguments from disagreement to adjudicate between semantic theories is in good standing. I propose a distinction between two kinds of definition of disagreement which explains the role of disagreement in semantic theory. Finally, I develop a general account of disagreement-in terms of the concept of incompatibility-which can fill this role.