On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar
This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending Hume from criticism regarding the naturali...
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ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-5905772015-12-03T03:47:56ZOn judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammarKirkby, David James2013This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending Hume from criticism regarding the naturalistic credentials of this program, I argue that Hume’s science of man, along with the conception of judgement which is integral to it, is appropriately understood as a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science. Despite this, I contend that Hume’s conception of judgement prompts a problem regarding the intentionality of judgement – a problem which he does not adequately address. In the second part of my thesis I show how the intentionality problem which Hume grapples with is also crucial, constituting a point of departure, for Kant’s transcendental undertaking. Following Kant’s reasoning, I illustrate how an original concern with this intentionality issue leads Kant to a distinct conception of judgement, according to which concepts only exist in the context of a judgement. Having arrived at Kant’s conception of a judgement, the remainder of the thesis is devoted to the issue of judgement forms. Kant’s postulation of these forms is closely related to his conception of judgement, and I seek to establish both how these forms ought to be understood and how they might be derived. In relation to this latter issue, I suggest that there may a role for contemporary work in Generative Grammar. Specifically, I suggest that it may be viable to understand the forms of judgement as grammatical in nature, thereby securing an interdisciplinary connection between a philosophy of judgement and the empirical investigation of grammar.100Durham Universityhttp://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.590577http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9451/Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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This thesis explores conceptions of judgement which have been central to various philosophical and scientific traditions. Beginning with Hume, I situate his conception of judgement within his overarching constructivist program, his science of man. Defending Hume from criticism regarding the naturalistic credentials of this program, I argue that Hume’s science of man, along with the conception of judgement which is integral to it, is appropriately understood as a forerunner to contemporary cognitive science. Despite this, I contend that Hume’s conception of judgement prompts a problem regarding the intentionality of judgement – a problem which he does not adequately address. In the second part of my thesis I show how the intentionality problem which Hume grapples with is also crucial, constituting a point of departure, for Kant’s transcendental undertaking. Following Kant’s reasoning, I illustrate how an original concern with this intentionality issue leads Kant to a distinct conception of judgement, according to which concepts only exist in the context of a judgement. Having arrived at Kant’s conception of a judgement, the remainder of the thesis is devoted to the issue of judgement forms. Kant’s postulation of these forms is closely related to his conception of judgement, and I seek to establish both how these forms ought to be understood and how they might be derived. In relation to this latter issue, I suggest that there may a role for contemporary work in Generative Grammar. Specifically, I suggest that it may be viable to understand the forms of judgement as grammatical in nature, thereby securing an interdisciplinary connection between a philosophy of judgement and the empirical investigation of grammar. |
author |
Kirkby, David James |
author_facet |
Kirkby, David James |
author_sort |
Kirkby, David James |
title |
On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar |
title_short |
On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar |
title_full |
On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar |
title_fullStr |
On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar |
title_full_unstemmed |
On judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar |
title_sort |
on judgement : psychological genesis, intentionality and grammar |
publisher |
Durham University |
publishDate |
2013 |
url |
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.590577 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT kirkbydavidjames onjudgementpsychologicalgenesisintentionalityandgrammar |
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