Thoughts and oughts

• Main Author: Kalantari, Seyed Ali
• Published: University of Warwick 2013
• Subjects: 100; B Philosophy (General)
• Online Access: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.595759

My dissertation concerns post Kripkean debates which locate normativity not as a feature of linguistic meaning but as applicable to mental content. My aim is to identify a clear sense in which the thesis is plausible and to defend the thesis against recent criticisms. In order to do this, I will consider the two main premises that the normativity thesis is based upon, namely, (a) that belief is conceptually priority to desire and (b) that belief is a normative concept. Most criticisms of the normativity thesis in the literature argue against the latter premise, namely, the normativity of belief thesis. I first argue that recent objections against the priority of belief to desire do not undermine the normativity thesis in the case of mental content. I then concentrate on the normativity of belief to defend the thesis. I will consider the logic of the normativity of belief thesis and suggest viable formulations of the thesis. I will also defuse recent objections against the normativity of belief thesis and I establish a new argument for the thesis.