Strategic airline alliances and restrictions of competition by object under EU competition law

• Main Author: Remetei-Filep, Ádám
• Published: King's College London (University of London) 2013
• Subjects: 343.07
• Online Access: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.628354

In this thesis, the question is asked whether, in the light of the ’more economic approach’ adopted in recent years, it is correct to classify metal-neutral revenue-sharing airline alliances as restrictive of competition by object and interpret this concept in a wider sense under Article 101(1) TFEU. By relying on the example and analysis of airline alliances and in particular metal-neutral revenue-sharing alliances, the thesis argues that the ’orthodox’ or wider interpretation of restriction by object is correct and, as such, does not contradict the idea behind the more economic approach of EU competition law. However, the analysis of restriction by object has to take into account the effects of Article 101 TFEU as a whole, including Article 101(3) TFEU. Therefore this wider interpretation of object restrictions must be complemented by a realistic application of Article 101(3) TFEU, in order to achieve the desired outcome of an administrable and efficient enforcement regime that minimises error costs. This is a legal thesis. It will review the EU competition law approach to airline alliances and use the example of airline alliances to explore the issue of restriction by object and its interaction with Article 101(3) TFEU. The thesis examines both from an economic and legal point of view all those aspects of strategic alliances, air transport and strategic airline alliances that are essential for a thorough understanding of their characteristics when analysed under Article 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU. The research question concentrates on the dichotomy of Article 101 TFEU, and it is concluded that the experience of the aviation industry supports the thesis.