Detection and deterrence in the economics of corruption : a game theoretic analysis and some experimental evidence
This thesis contributes to our understanding of corruption deterrence for a specific class of game-theoretic corruption models, in which we assume that inspection of corrupt be- haviour happens through randomisation. Three models are explored theoretically and one experimentally. All models are thre...
Main Author: | Spengler, Dominic E. |
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Other Authors: | Bone, John ; Matravers, Matt ; Piller, Christian |
Published: |
University of York
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.634379 |
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