The phenomenological correlates of acting on delusions

The study consisted of the examination of the phenomenological correlates of acting on delusions in a sample of 83 newly admitted psychotic subjects who demonstrated at least one non-mood congruent delusion. Subjects were screened to identify such beliefs using the P.S.E. and where several delusions...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Buchanan, Alec
Published: University of Edinburgh 1996
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Online Access:http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.642185
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Summary:The study consisted of the examination of the phenomenological correlates of acting on delusions in a sample of 83 newly admitted psychotic subjects who demonstrated at least one non-mood congruent delusion. Subjects were screened to identify such beliefs using the P.S.E. and where several delusions were present one belief was selected for further study. This was termed the Principal Belief. Each subject was then interviewed using a newly designed instrument, the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule, in order to describe the phenomenology of the Principal Belief. Several areas of phenomenology were examined, namely, the degree of conviction with which the belief was held, the presence or absence of evidence supporting the belief, the affective content of that belief, its systematisation, the level of pre-occupation present and the level of insight demonstrated by the subject. In addition, information was obtained relating to two behavioural variables, one derived from the subject's own description and the other generated from information provided by informants. The phenomenological correlates of action defined in these two ways were then examined. When action was defined on the basis of information provided by informants, no such correlates were identified. It seems most likely that this reflects the lack of validity of the behavioural variable. When action was defined on the basis of information provided by the subjects themselves, several aspects of phenomenology were associated with such action. In particular, the ability to identify evidence supporting the belief, the presence of an affective component to that belief and the presence of a form of insight (a willingness, when challenged, to change the degree of conviction with which the belief was held) showed such an association.