Summary: | Studies into schematic and symbolic hypotyposis in Kant’s Critical works rarely set out how different types of concept and idea are realised comprehensively. As a consequence, it is difficult to compare the two types of exhibition in respect to how they differ and relate to one another. There are numerous reasons why these two modes have not been set out with clarity, I will focus on three. The first pertains to the nature of the subject matter itself as the schematism chapter is notoriously dense. Attempts to render Kant’s account coherent consistently fail to acknowledge the schema he addresses in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and as a result they cannot be considered comprehensive or exhaustive. Secondly, the realisation of practical ideas is rarely addressed, referred to or included for comparison in works that address schemata and symbols. Consequently, one cannot gain a comprehensive view of Kant’s account of exhibition. The practical schemata (if one may call them that) prove interesting as they challenge the distinction between direct and indirect exhibition that Kant sets out so confidently in § 59 of the Third Critique (5:352). Thirdly, attempts to present Kant’s account of the symbol with clarity either seek to reduce the symbol to a mode of schematic exhibition (in line with schema from the Architectonic of Pure Reason), or, they fail to distinguish between the examples Kant gives and consequently make claims about one type of symbol based upon their understanding of another, all of which results in further confusion and complications. This thesis will present a clarification of Kant’s account of exhibition with respect to the use of symbols, schemata, and analogy to establish the extent to which philosophy must appropriate art to communicate ideas and concepts. It will draw out the rhetorical connotations affiliated with the term hypotyposis and present the consequences of this in respect to philosophical methodology.
|