A game theoretic modeling framework for decentralised transmission planning

• Main Author: Fan, Ying
• Other Authors: Strbac, Goran ; Jaimoukha, Imad
• Published: Imperial College London 2016
• Subjects: 621.319
• Online Access: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.684355

During the last two decades, significant efforts towards the deregulation of the electricity industry have been observed worldwide, involving the unbundling of vertically integrated monopoly utilities, the introduction of competition in the generation and supply sectors, and the open access to the electricity network. In contrast with traditionally regulated paradigm, deregulation calls for more involving participants for bringing more competition. In order to facilitate the participation of large number of players, a novel market structure, where individual player seeking for its own interest, is proposed by a project called 'Autonomic Power System'; according to which, the new structure will accommodate both the operation(short-term) and investment(long-term) need for the future complex electricity market in decentralised pattern. Specifically, players are encouraged to enter the market and participate in the sectors they are interested in. Players can be existing and new generating units, demand suppliers that represent aggregated customers and even merchant companies who are neither generating units nor demand suppliers. The sectors they could participate include power scheduling, generation investment and transmission network investment etc. Game theory and Agent-based modelling are both good tools to model the behaviours of numerous players and their mutual effect with each other. A central entity will be present for reconciling conflicting objectives if necessary. In this thesis, due to the incompetence in allocating investment cost among system users given traditional centralised planning paradigm, we mainly focus on proposing methods for decentralised investing in the network; under which circumstance, transmission planning will rely on market forces and profit-driven decisions of self-interested players. This paradigm will gain continuous grounds as it accounts for the interests of the different market agents and is deemed as a further step towards the liberalisation and efficient operation of the electricity industry. An iterative method is employed to search for Nash equilibrium of the game and a heuristic approach is adopted for deriving a coordinated solution when no or multiple NE are reached. Case studies will demonstrate the individual investment intentions for different situations and the physical/economic significance of the obtained solutions.