John Rawl's actual contractualism

This thesis argues for an unorthodox interpretation of John Rawls's egalitarianism as a hybrid of 'actual contractualism' and 'modal contractualism'. It also offers a defence of the theory so understood. According to actual contractualism, a system of political institutions...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Porter, William Thomas M.
Published: University College London (University of London) 2008
Subjects:
Online Access:http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.686692
id ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-686692
record_format oai_dc
spelling ndltd-bl.uk-oai-ethos.bl.uk-6866922017-10-04T03:13:31ZJohn Rawl's actual contractualismPorter, William Thomas M.2008This thesis argues for an unorthodox interpretation of John Rawls's egalitarianism as a hybrid of 'actual contractualism' and 'modal contractualism'. It also offers a defence of the theory so understood. According to actual contractualism, a system of political institutions and norms is just only if each person over whom it claims authority actually accepts it in some sense. Actual contractualists stand in contrast with modal contractualists, who take jusuce to require that no one could reasonably reject the institutions and norms in question. Rawls is standardly read as a modal contractualist, but I argue that his view includes an significant element of actual contractualism. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part describes actual contractualism and contrasts it with modal contractualism. It goes on to consider the possibility of a hybrid theory, which appeals to modal contractualist reasons to justify an actual contractualist test for justice. I suggest that this is an attractive view. In trie second part I go on to argue that a careful understanding of Rawls's theory view reveals it to be hybrid contractualist. I elaborate Rawls's strategy of 'political constructivism' in the light of this interpretation, and attempt to show that it is very much in the Lockean actual contractualist tradition. The final part of the thesis concerns the justification of specifically Rawls's egalitananism. I contend that Rawls's argument for justice as fairness can be seen as a detailed effort to explain why his egalitarianism is, in the relevant sense, actually accepted by each person, and I argue that as such it succeeds. I then contrast the Rawlsian view with left-libertariamsm, another attempt to marry actual contractualism and egalitananism. I argue that Rawls's is the more thoroughgoing, unified view, and should be preferred on that basis.320.01PhilosophyUniversity College London (University of London)http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.686692http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445282/Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
collection NDLTD
sources NDLTD
topic 320.01
Philosophy
spellingShingle 320.01
Philosophy
Porter, William Thomas M.
John Rawl's actual contractualism
description This thesis argues for an unorthodox interpretation of John Rawls's egalitarianism as a hybrid of 'actual contractualism' and 'modal contractualism'. It also offers a defence of the theory so understood. According to actual contractualism, a system of political institutions and norms is just only if each person over whom it claims authority actually accepts it in some sense. Actual contractualists stand in contrast with modal contractualists, who take jusuce to require that no one could reasonably reject the institutions and norms in question. Rawls is standardly read as a modal contractualist, but I argue that his view includes an significant element of actual contractualism. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part describes actual contractualism and contrasts it with modal contractualism. It goes on to consider the possibility of a hybrid theory, which appeals to modal contractualist reasons to justify an actual contractualist test for justice. I suggest that this is an attractive view. In trie second part I go on to argue that a careful understanding of Rawls's theory view reveals it to be hybrid contractualist. I elaborate Rawls's strategy of 'political constructivism' in the light of this interpretation, and attempt to show that it is very much in the Lockean actual contractualist tradition. The final part of the thesis concerns the justification of specifically Rawls's egalitananism. I contend that Rawls's argument for justice as fairness can be seen as a detailed effort to explain why his egalitarianism is, in the relevant sense, actually accepted by each person, and I argue that as such it succeeds. I then contrast the Rawlsian view with left-libertariamsm, another attempt to marry actual contractualism and egalitananism. I argue that Rawls's is the more thoroughgoing, unified view, and should be preferred on that basis.
author Porter, William Thomas M.
author_facet Porter, William Thomas M.
author_sort Porter, William Thomas M.
title John Rawl's actual contractualism
title_short John Rawl's actual contractualism
title_full John Rawl's actual contractualism
title_fullStr John Rawl's actual contractualism
title_full_unstemmed John Rawl's actual contractualism
title_sort john rawl's actual contractualism
publisher University College London (University of London)
publishDate 2008
url http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.686692
work_keys_str_mv AT porterwilliamthomasm johnrawlsactualcontractualism
_version_ 1718542844978790400