An analysis of CEO equity compensation in an incomplete contracting framework
I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Almazan and Suarez, 2003). I argue that costs of dismissal are increased because equity grants become exercisable upon forced departure. Equity grants can increase the costs of leaving because voluntari...
Main Author: | Kiefer, Matthias |
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Published: |
Heriot-Watt University
2015
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.700504 |
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