You don't say! : lying, asserting and insincerity
This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory t...
Main Author: | Marsili, Neri |
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Other Authors: | Saul, Jennifer ; Faulkner, Paul |
Published: |
University of Sheffield
2017
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.731535 |
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