Power distribution and the results of interregional crisis: distant powers, uncertain balances

• Main Author: Pang, Ruizhi
• Other Authors: Berger, Thomas
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2021
• Subjects: International relations; Distribution of power; Geographic distance; International crisis; Interregional relations; Power balance; War
• Online Access: https://hdl.handle.net/2144/43374

International Relations theory has paid bare attention to the dynamics of results of crisis between powers operating in different regions. Existing literature shows that when a power is predominant in a region, major war is less likely to take place in that specific region. However, it is not clear whether the rule of predominant stability applies to situations where a major crisis arises between a local power and a geographically distant power. This project argues that two variables, Local Distribution of Power and Dyadic interregional Distribution of Power, determine the Result of Major interregional Crisis (war onset or peaceful resolution). Local Distribution of Power refers to distribution of power among local players and takes on two values: preponderance and non-preponderance. Dyadic interregional Distribution of Power refers to the power balance between the local power and the geographically outside power that confront each other in a major interregional crisis. It takes on three values: outside superiority, local-outside balance and local superiority. A large N analysis is used to test the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. And three longitudinal case studies are used to reveal the causal mechanism between the Dyadic interregional Distribution of Power and the Result of Major interregional Crisis. It is observed that when a major interregional crisis breaks out, a predominant local power distribution and power superiority of the outside power is more likely to end up in war, while a predominant local power distribution and a balanced dyadic interregional power distribution is more likely to lead to peaceful resolution of the crisis. In the former case, the complacent outside power tend to refuse to make concessions, while the local power, dominated by determination, opportunism and perceptions of local advantage, tends to opt for war. Other local players are also motivated to rely on the outside power to challenge the local power, which might entangle the outside power into war. In the latter case, the outside power, given its disadvantage of locality, tend to be cautious and refuse to be entangled by third parties into conflict, while the local power, being confident and aware of the high cost of a war, tend to be assertive but cautious, which contributes to peaceful resolution of the crisis.