To Become Again What We Never Were: Foucault and the Politics of Transformation

• Main Author: Dankel, Tara Marie
• Other Authors: Monius, Anne E.
• Format: Others
• Language: en
• Published: Harvard University 2015
• Subjects: Philosophy; Environmental Sciences
• Online Access: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:14226059

This dissertation began with two questions. First, how does Michel Foucault understand ethical subject formation as demonstrated in his late work? Second, does the failure of environmental activism in the United States to achieve radical change in individuals' perspectives and practices derive from a faulty understanding of the human subject? I address these questions in two stages. In the body of the dissertation--through close reading in French of the courses at the Collège de France from 1981-1984 and Foucault's late interviews, essays, and occasional lectures--I engage in exegesis of some of the basic terms of his late work on ethics, including conversion, askēsis, parrhēsia, and the self. The key conclusions that I draw from this work are five-fold: (1) the self is a process rather than a substance, and ethical transformation requires questioning the assumptions and values of one's society and conversion to a different regime of truth; (2) conversion occurs through daily training of the mind and body through practice, what Foucault calls "the subjectivation of true discourse," and is a life-long task; (3) this training must be supported both by intimate relationships of friendship and guidance and larger communities of practice; (4) social transformation occurs through personal transformation in the course of demonstrating the truth to others through words and actions, a practice Foucault terms parrhēsia; (5) Foucault imagines freedom both as the radical contingency of reality and the ability of individuals to think and be otherwise. Freedom is not a possession or state, but a practice. In the introduction, I explore the importance of troubling the subject of environmental philosophy and activism, arguing that one key reason that environmental activism is ineffective is the lack of critical reflection on theories of subjectivity. In the conclusion, I bring Foucault into conversation with Bill McKibben, one of the most prominent environmental activists in the United States. Thinking with these two men, I suggest some ways in which a Foucauldian understanding of ethical subject formation might promote better strategies for individual change.