Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state?
Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibl...
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ndltd-netd.ac.za-oai-union.ndltd.org-unisa-oai-umkn-dsp01.int.unisa.ac.za-10500-180822016-04-16T04:08:49Z Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? Bernstein, David Martin Van Wyk, D. H. Analysis of Section 33(1)(b) Borrowed Provisions Complex Interpretative Conundrums Insurmountable Obstacle Myopic Guidance - enter our Constitutional Court Academic Opinion Boundary Demarcation Prognosis of Working Draft Re:- Section 35(1 )(b) Solution: Inverted value orientated/residual approach 342.85068 Civil rights -- South Africa Human rights -- South Africa Constitutional courts -- South Africa Constitutional law -- South Africa Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. Law LL.M. 2015-01-23T04:24:56Z 2015-01-23T04:24:56Z 1996-01 Dissertation http://hdl.handle.net/10500/18082 en 1 online resource (48 leaves) |
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Analysis of Section 33(1)(b) Borrowed Provisions Complex Interpretative Conundrums Insurmountable Obstacle Myopic Guidance - enter our Constitutional Court Academic Opinion Boundary Demarcation Prognosis of Working Draft Re:- Section 35(1 )(b) Solution: Inverted value orientated/residual approach 342.85068 Civil rights -- South Africa Human rights -- South Africa Constitutional courts -- South Africa Constitutional law -- South Africa |
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Analysis of Section 33(1)(b) Borrowed Provisions Complex Interpretative Conundrums Insurmountable Obstacle Myopic Guidance - enter our Constitutional Court Academic Opinion Boundary Demarcation Prognosis of Working Draft Re:- Section 35(1 )(b) Solution: Inverted value orientated/residual approach 342.85068 Civil rights -- South Africa Human rights -- South Africa Constitutional courts -- South Africa Constitutional law -- South Africa Bernstein, David Martin Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? |
description |
Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries
German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional
Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted
infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is
evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the
clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their
neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b)
demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After
all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting
where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the
limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could
be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every
right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an
inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. === Law === LL.M. |
author2 |
Van Wyk, D. H. |
author_facet |
Van Wyk, D. H. Bernstein, David Martin |
author |
Bernstein, David Martin |
author_sort |
Bernstein, David Martin |
title |
Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? |
title_short |
Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? |
title_full |
Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? |
title_fullStr |
Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? |
title_sort |
stumbling on the essential content of a right : an insurmountable hurdle for the state? |
publishDate |
2015 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10500/18082 |
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AT bernsteindavidmartin stumblingontheessentialcontentofarightaninsurmountablehurdleforthestate |
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